The unforgettable YuLong River 遇龙河, YangShuo 阳朔 and Impression Liu SanJie 印象刘三姐

With Lulu's Daily In China ... Welcome to the Forbidden City Explore the imperial palace and ancient architecture of the Forbidden City in Beijing. Introduction The Forbidden City, also known as the Palace Museum, is a vast imperial palace complex in Beijing, China. It served as the home of emperors and their households, as well as the ceremonial and political center of the Chinese government for almost 500 years. Location The Forbidden City is located in the Dongcheng District in the heart of Beijing, directly north of Tiananmen Square. History The construction of the Forbidden City began in 1406 and was completed in 1420. It was the Chinese imperial palace from the Ming dynasty to the end of the Qing dynasty, housing 24 emperors. The complex covers 72 hectares (178 acres) and consists of 980 surviving buildings with 8,886 rooms. In 1925, the Forbidden City was transformed into the Palace Museum, showcasing extensive collections of artwork and artifacts from the imperial collections of the Ming and Qing dynasties. It was designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1987. Attractions Meridian Gate (Wu Men): The main entrance to the Forbidden City, known for its grand architecture and historical significance. Hall of Supreme Harmony (Taihe Dian): The largest hall in the Forbidden City, used for major ceremonial occasions. Hall of Central Harmony (Zhonghe Dian): A smaller, intimate hall where the emperor prepared and rested before ceremonies. Hall of Preserving Harmony (Baohe Dian): Used for banquets and later for imperial examinations. Palace of Heavenly Purity (Qianqing Gong): The emperor's residence, representing his supreme authority. Hall of Union (Jiaotai Dian): A hall connecting the emperor's and empress's palaces, symbolizing their union. Palace of Earthly Tranquility (Kunning Gong): The residence of the empress and the site for imperial weddings. Imperial Garden: A serene garden area with ancient trees, rockeries, and pavilions, used by the imperial family for leisure. Clock and Watch Gallery: Displays a vast collection of timepieces from the imperial collection. Treasure Gallery: Houses valuable artifacts, including jade, gold, and other treasures from the imperial era. Activities Exploring historical buildings and courtyards Visiting museum exhibitions Photography Participating in guided tours Attending cultural performances and events Facilities Visitor Center Restrooms Gift Shops Cafes and Restaurants Parking Lots Audio Guide Rentals Guided Tour Services Visitor Tips Wear comfortable walking shoes. Bring water and snacks, especially if you plan to stay for several hours. Visit early in the morning or late in the afternoon to avoid crowds. Check the weather forecast and dress appropriately. Respect the cultural and historical significance of the site; behave appropriately and follow all rules and guidelines. Plan your visit to include the main attractions and leave time for exploring lesser-known areas.

ShangHai (including Disney), BeiJing, Xi'An, ChengDu, YangShuo, Hong Kong ...

One missile - 16 people died, to silence truth. Michael Hudson on how human rights have been privatized / commercialized (monetized) in the US ...

Provincial capital of GuangDong. GuangZhou, on the Pearl River about 120 kilometers (75 miles) north-northwest of Hong Kong, has a long history and was a major starting port for the Silk Road of the Sea. The city features avant-garde architecture such as the GuangZhou Opera House (also known as the Double Pebble), the carved, box-shaped GuangDong Museum, and the iconic, and unusually feminine, Canton TV Tower skyscraper, that resembles a slim hourglass.

KūnMíng is the provincial capital city of YunNan.

Jiddu Krishnamurti talks about how we are enslaved, and how to be free; clear sight, without prejudice, reveals the truth / what is - that is the true knowing / now. "Distortion will inevitably come into being when there is fragmentation, when one part of you condones or condemns what you observe. We are the result of propaganda, what we have been told from childhood to believe and not to believe. Knowledge is the past; there is no knowledge in the present. To be aware without choice is to observe without the observer, which is the past, the image-maker." BB says : truth begins when belief ends ... To be free, to be eternal, is to be here, right now, not chained to the past (baggage that blinds us), or forever focused on the future (in fear). This, is it. Until we realise it, the past controls us - both own own experience (in those chains), and all that we have believed. The past gives rise to fear. Love is the absence of fear.

With Walk East ... With Walk China ...

With Cyrus Janssen ... Comment by Gustavo Andrés ... There is an overwhelming assumption in the West that China’s Achilles heel is the state: that it lacks legitimacy. This is the underlying reason why Westerners believe that China’s transformation is unsustainable: that the political system cannot survive. It would be wrong to suggest that attitudes have not shifted: the endurance of the reform period, now over 35 years old, and the scale of its achievement have bred a growing if still grudging respect, and a less apocalyptic view of Chinese political change. Few now regard it to be imminent and many have extended their time horizons somewhat into the future. Nevertheless, most Westerners still regard China’s present political order as lacking legitimacy and as ultimately unsustainable. In the post 1945 period, Westerners have come to believe that Western-style democracy – essentially universal suffrage and a multi-party system – is more or less the sole source of a government’s legitimacy. This is a superficial and ahistorical position. Western-style democracy does not ensure the legitimacy of a regime in the eyes of its people: Italy is perhaps the classic example, with successive governments over a long historical period experiencing a chronic lack of legitimacy. And what of China? Although it does not have Western-style democracy, there is plenty of evidence – for example the Pew Global Attitude surveys and the work of Tony Saich at the Harvard Kennedy School – that the Chinese government enjoys high levels of support and legitimacy, much higher indeed than those of Western governments. How do we explain this? Clearly the reason is not Western-style democracy because China has not chosen this path. The late Lucian W. Pye, in his book ‘Asian Power and Politics’, argues that Western scholars have, in their understanding of politics, prioritised political systems over political cultures: Pye argues, correctly in my view, that the opposite is the case. His insight is highly relevant to the Chinese case. The relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that which characterises Western societies. There are three key elements. First, China is primarily a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, with the overriding and extremely difficult age-old task of government being to maintain the unity of China and its civilization. This has lent the state an enduring authority, importance and centrality in China that is very different from the Western nation-state tradition. The state is intrinsic to China in a way that this is not true in Western societies: they are, in effect, in large degree synonymous. Furthermore the Chinese regard the state in some degree as an expression and extension of themselves. Second, whereas in Western societies the state is seen in an instrumentalist and utilitarian way – in other words, what will it do for me? – in China, following from the Confucian tradition and the idea that the Emperor should model himself on the father’s role as the head of the family, the state is perceived in a familial way, whence the expression ‘nation-family’, or the idea of China as an extended family. Or, to put it another way, in Western societies the state is viewed as an external and somewhat artificial construct, for the Chinese it is an intimate. Third, a much higher premium is placed on the efficiency and efficacy of the state than in the West, whence the importance of meritocracy in the recruitment of public servants. In the West, discussion about the state largely revolves around the manner by which the government is selected, in China, by way of contrast, the competence of the state assumes priority. Fourthly, following from the previous point, the state is expected and required to deliver in China. Over the last few decades, of course, it has presided over and masterminded a huge transformation, the most remarkable in modern economic history. The contrast between the performance of the Chinese and Western economies is manifest. In summary, the relationship between the state and society in China and the West is profoundly different and the reasons lie in the historical and cultural differences between them. They can and should learn from each other but they will remain distinct. So what of the future? As I mentioned at the outset, it is axiomatic in the West that sooner or later China will face a crisis of governance that will result in profound reform along Western lines. In reality, it seems far more likely that the crisis of governance will occur in the West than China. The United States and Europe are in decline and, as a consequence, their ruling elites and political systems are already suffering from declining legitimacy and authority, a process that is likely to continue. China, in contrast, is a rising power whose ruling elite is likely to enjoy growing status and prestige as a consequence. China, though, faces its own kind of governance challenge. The country is changing at extraordinary speed. If one thinks of how the life of an ordinary person has changed over the course of the last three decades, then this is a measure of how everything else, including political rule, must also change in order to survive. Of course, transparency, representivity and accountability have been transformed since Mao’s death, but this is a dynamic process and arguably the greatest changes still lie in the future. It is not that China needs to or should change its system – it has stood the test of time and managed to stay abreast of and lead the wider transformations – but, this notwithstanding, more profound ways must be found to modernise the political system and its institutions if they are to meet the demands and expectations of a very different society.