ChongZhou 崇州, ChengDu, SiChuan province

A beautiful and creative short film by Francis So ...

Step back in time with Tim and Glo as they visit HóngCūn, in the historical HuiZhou region of southern AnHui province, near the south west slope of Mount HuangShan, plus the close-by MuKeng Bamboo Forest. The architecture and features of the approximately 150 residences that date from the Ming and Qing dynasties are among the best of their kind in China. One of the largest residences open to visitors, ChenZhi Hall, also contains a small museum. Together with nearby XiDi, the village is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Scenes from the film 'Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon' were filmed on location here.

Persimmons taste like no other fruit. They have a silky, slippery texture and taste kind of like the fabulous fruity love child of a mango and a roasted sweet pepper, with some cinnamon in the background. They are rich and tangy and sweet, all at the same time. --- TreeHugger May the red, red persimmons bring you a happy, prosperous New Year ! 愿一串串的红柿子给大家带来新一年的柿柿顺心 ❤️

The Ming Tombs are a collection of mausoleums built by emperors of the Ming dynasty. They lie within the ChangPing District of BeiJing Municipality, 40 kilometers (25 miles) north-northwest of Beijing city center. The site was chosen based on the principles of Feng Shui by the third Ming emperor, YongLe. Construction began after completion of the Imperial Palace (Forbidden City) in 1420. Subsequent emperors placed their tombs in the same valley; 13 in total. The siting of the Ming dynasty imperial tombs was carefully chosen according to Feng Shui principles. A key guide is that bad spirits and cold winds from the north must be deflected; therefore, an arc-shaped valley area at the foot of the JunDu Mountains was selected. This 40 square kilometer area, enclosed by mountains in a pristine, quiet valley with dark earth and tranquil water became the necropolis of the Ming dynasty. A 7 kilometer (4 mile) path named the Spirit Way, or Sacred Way, leads into the complex, lined with statues of guardian animals and officials, with a front memorial gate consisting of three arches called the Great Red Gate; constructed in 1540, it is one of the biggest stone archways in China. Further in, lies the ShenGong ShengDe Stele Pavilion with a 50 tonne stone statue of BiXi carrying a memorial tablet. Four white marble HuaBiao (pillars of glory) are positioned at each corner of the pavilion; at the top of each is a mythical beast. Then come two pillars on each side of the path, whose surfaces are carved with a cloud design, and tops are shaped like a cylinder; these are of a traditional design and were originally beacons to guide the soul of the deceased, The path leads to 18 pairs of stone statues of mythical animals, which are all sculpted from single blocks; these are all larger than life size. After, the path leads to a three-arched gate known as the Dragon and Phoenix Gate. Two of the mausoleums are open to visitors, but it is the beauty of the valley, with orchards, and the sheer scale of the area used for the tombs, that make this a nice day out in the countryside.

With Cyrus Janssen ... Comment by Gustavo Andrés ... There is an overwhelming assumption in the West that China’s Achilles heel is the state: that it lacks legitimacy. This is the underlying reason why Westerners believe that China’s transformation is unsustainable: that the political system cannot survive. It would be wrong to suggest that attitudes have not shifted: the endurance of the reform period, now over 35 years old, and the scale of its achievement have bred a growing if still grudging respect, and a less apocalyptic view of Chinese political change. Few now regard it to be imminent and many have extended their time horizons somewhat into the future. Nevertheless, most Westerners still regard China’s present political order as lacking legitimacy and as ultimately unsustainable. In the post 1945 period, Westerners have come to believe that Western-style democracy – essentially universal suffrage and a multi-party system – is more or less the sole source of a government’s legitimacy. This is a superficial and ahistorical position. Western-style democracy does not ensure the legitimacy of a regime in the eyes of its people: Italy is perhaps the classic example, with successive governments over a long historical period experiencing a chronic lack of legitimacy. And what of China? Although it does not have Western-style democracy, there is plenty of evidence – for example the Pew Global Attitude surveys and the work of Tony Saich at the Harvard Kennedy School – that the Chinese government enjoys high levels of support and legitimacy, much higher indeed than those of Western governments. How do we explain this? Clearly the reason is not Western-style democracy because China has not chosen this path. The late Lucian W. Pye, in his book ‘Asian Power and Politics’, argues that Western scholars have, in their understanding of politics, prioritised political systems over political cultures: Pye argues, correctly in my view, that the opposite is the case. His insight is highly relevant to the Chinese case. The relationship between the state and society in China is very different from that which characterises Western societies. There are three key elements. First, China is primarily a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, with the overriding and extremely difficult age-old task of government being to maintain the unity of China and its civilization. This has lent the state an enduring authority, importance and centrality in China that is very different from the Western nation-state tradition. The state is intrinsic to China in a way that this is not true in Western societies: they are, in effect, in large degree synonymous. Furthermore the Chinese regard the state in some degree as an expression and extension of themselves. Second, whereas in Western societies the state is seen in an instrumentalist and utilitarian way – in other words, what will it do for me? – in China, following from the Confucian tradition and the idea that the Emperor should model himself on the father’s role as the head of the family, the state is perceived in a familial way, whence the expression ‘nation-family’, or the idea of China as an extended family. Or, to put it another way, in Western societies the state is viewed as an external and somewhat artificial construct, for the Chinese it is an intimate. Third, a much higher premium is placed on the efficiency and efficacy of the state than in the West, whence the importance of meritocracy in the recruitment of public servants. In the West, discussion about the state largely revolves around the manner by which the government is selected, in China, by way of contrast, the competence of the state assumes priority. Fourthly, following from the previous point, the state is expected and required to deliver in China. Over the last few decades, of course, it has presided over and masterminded a huge transformation, the most remarkable in modern economic history. The contrast between the performance of the Chinese and Western economies is manifest. In summary, the relationship between the state and society in China and the West is profoundly different and the reasons lie in the historical and cultural differences between them. They can and should learn from each other but they will remain distinct. So what of the future? As I mentioned at the outset, it is axiomatic in the West that sooner or later China will face a crisis of governance that will result in profound reform along Western lines. In reality, it seems far more likely that the crisis of governance will occur in the West than China. The United States and Europe are in decline and, as a consequence, their ruling elites and political systems are already suffering from declining legitimacy and authority, a process that is likely to continue. China, in contrast, is a rising power whose ruling elite is likely to enjoy growing status and prestige as a consequence. China, though, faces its own kind of governance challenge. The country is changing at extraordinary speed. If one thinks of how the life of an ordinary person has changed over the course of the last three decades, then this is a measure of how everything else, including political rule, must also change in order to survive. Of course, transparency, representivity and accountability have been transformed since Mao’s death, but this is a dynamic process and arguably the greatest changes still lie in the future. It is not that China needs to or should change its system – it has stood the test of time and managed to stay abreast of and lead the wider transformations – but, this notwithstanding, more profound ways must be found to modernise the political system and its institutions if they are to meet the demands and expectations of a very different society.

With Walk East ...